Investment Banking, the Certification Effect and M&amp;A Deals: an Event Study approach by Bonini, Stefano et al.
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 2, Winter 2017, Continued - 2 
 
383 
INVESTMENT BANKING, THE CERTIFICATION 
EFFECT AND M&A DEALS: AN EVENT STUDY 
APPROACH 
 
Stefano Bonini*, Vincenzo Capizzi**, Renato Giovannini***, Stefano Rossoni**** 
 
*Stevens Institute of Technology School of Business, USA 
**Department of Economics and Business Studies, Università del Piemonte Orientale, SDA Bocconi School of Management, Italy 
***Department of Economics and Management Guglielmo Marconi University, SDA Bocconi School of Management, Italy 
****Department of Economics and Management Guglielmo Marconi University, Italy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Several studies have found the existence of a relationship between the role of investment banks 
appointed as advisors in M&A deals and the yields earned by their clients. Traditionally this 
relationship is fostered by the ability of the leading investment banks to arrange and structure 
the best deals – i.e. the Superior Deal Hypothesis – and by the “certification effect”, namely that 
their presence provides assurance to the capital markets where are traded the companies 
involved– i.e. the Certification Effect. Our study also investigates the strength and direction of 
this relationship before and after Lehman Brothers collapse. The analysis, which uses an original 
composite metric in order to measure the reputation variable, is focused on the transactions 
that took place between listed companies in two time frames specifically pre and post the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The total sample is composed of 229 transactions, divided into 
161 and 68 observations, pre and post Lehman respectively. The analysis conducted allows us to 
separate the Superior Deal Hypothesis from Certification Effect. On evidence, after the Lehman 
default, the wealth of shareholders involved (both relating to the targets and acquirers) is 
significantly influenced by the reputation of the investment banks which acted as advisors. 
Conversely, before the start of the financial turmoil in September 2008, no significant evidence 
has been found. The analysis conducted suggests that subsequent to the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, the certification effect has been playing a crucial role in shareholders’ choice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Merger and acquisition deals (M&A) are one of the 
most important activities in the field of corporate 
finance and, also relating to those who offer and 
carry out investment banking activities. The 
importance of this phenomenon can be understood 
from the fact that in 2007, at the time of the most 
recent wave of M&A activities, about 4.2 trillion 
dollars were invested in such activities at the global 
level. In the meanwhile, investment banks acting as 
advisors for the counterparties in such transactions, 
generated revenues in the form of fees to a value of 
approximately 39.7 billion dollars. A large 
proportion of this value was earned by only ten 
banks, which acted as advisors in most of the 
operations. It is difficult to find empirical support in 
the literature for the relationship between the 
reputation of investment banks appointed as 
advisors, and the quality of the services offered by 
these banks (McConnell and Sibilkov, 2016). Indeed, 
the results obtained on this matter are often 
discordant or not significant. Possible reasons for 
such discordances can be found in the use of 
different measurement methodologies selected by 
scholars for the proxy reputation (McLaughlin, 1990; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Rau, 2000; Bau and 
Edmans, 2011, Morrison et al., 2014) as well as in the 
different business areas – securities issuances in 
capital markets, M&A advisory, private equity 
investments, risk management services – of the 
investment banking industry investigated 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 
1996; Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007; Fernando et al., 
2012; Li, 2016).  
Motivated by the new economic-financial 
context that has developed after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, which has undoubtedly altered 
the investment banking competitive landscape, this 
paper aims to study the relationship between 
investment bank reputation and the quality of the 
services they offer as advisors in M&A operations. 
According to the previous literature (Ellis et al., 
2006; Capizzi, 2007a, Bau and Edmans, 2011; 
Morrison et al., 2014), the quality of services offered 
would be expressed by the bank's capacity to 
increase the potential for creating shareholder value 
in corporate mergers and acquisitions, i.e. the 
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operations in which the control of a company is 
transferred by means of the transfer of ownership. A 
distinctive feature of the research carried out in this 
paper compared to the previous literature, is 
represented by the focus on a sample of acquisitions 
and mergers which have taken place between listed 
companies only. This choice was made for several 
reasons. The first is that the investment banks 
reputation is not equally important in all 
transactions and its effects are more pronounced in 
situations which create a greater exposure to the 
reputation risk (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 
2012). As Rhee and Valdez (2009) suggest, greater 
visibility leads to higher potential damage to 
reputation. The second reason depends on the fact 
that in operations involving listed companies it is 
more difficult for the counterparties to capture and 
release value in their own favor by means of the 
greater contractual power held by the listed 
companies compared to the non-listed companies. 
Therefore, the acquisitions in which the target is 
also listed require greater skill and ability (Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002) on the part of the 
advisors that assist the negotiation, in order to 
obtain maximum value from the transaction. For 
these reasons, the reputation of the investment 
banks can have a determining role in M&A 
operations between listed companies (Golubov et al., 
2012). 
Having said this, focusing on a sample which 
includes only transactions between listed 
companies, the purpose of the empirical analysis is 
to verify whether, there is any significant 
relationship between the creation of value for the 
shareholders and the reputation of the investment 
bank which assists the operation regarding M&A 
deals.  
As such, we investigate if the value creation 
path, both for the acquirer (or bidder) and the target 
(or seller), is sustained or boosted by the ability of a 
top tier investment bank in selecting, arranging and 
structuring the deal – i.e. Superior Deal Hypothesis – 
or in the Certification Role that is played by the 
investment banks. Consequently, the major 
contribution of the paper is to fill the gap in the 
extant literature, which has not found yet 
unambiguous evidence about the value creating 
potential of M&A advisory relationships. 
 
2. M&A DEALS IN THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between reputation, quality and 
price13 is dealt with in the models of Klein and 
Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Allen (1984). 
These models are applied to situations in which a 
subject repeatedly sells its own products on the 
market. When the quality of the product could be 
ascertained only after the purchase, a premium price 
was taken as a symbol of high product quality. This 
premium price exists to compensate the seller for 
the resources used to create a better reputation for 
himself. The models linked to a generic market, have 
also been applied within other studies in the 
literature relating to the provision of investment 
banking services. In fact, investment banks need to 
                                                          
13 This work does not take into consideration the dynamics relative to the 
fees applied by the investment banks. 
sell their own services repeatedly and the quality of 
such services cannot be seen in advance. Since 
investment banks are remunerated for the services 
which they offer continuously on the financial 
market and their permanence on such markets 
depends on the quality of the services supplied and 
from the correct behaviour adopted, there is no 
doubt that in such a scenario the advisor's 
reputation assumes a major role. For example, 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) applied the model 
to equity underwriting services. In their model, 
investment banks with a high reputation gave better 
services and asked for higher fees. The literature has 
examined this theoretical model, and the 
considerable empirical evidence related to IPOs and 
SEOs, has confirmed the fundamental role of bank 
reputation in guaranteeing higher quality services 
and a more credible certification effect on the value 
of the securities issued.  
Continuing with our literature review, it can be 
noted that the literature regarding corporate control 
also takes into consideration other viewpoints and 
other classifications of banks and financial 
intermediaries. For example, Allen, Jagtiani, 
Peristiani and Saunders (2004) have examined the 
role of commercial banks as financial consultants. 
The authors have shown that the returns on the buy-
side are not linked to whether they use their own 
commercial bank as an advisor in an M&A operation. 
Recently, Song and Wei (2010) have concentrated 
instead on the role of the “boutiques14” and on the 
comparison of these banks against the performance 
of traditional investment banks, which offer 
complete investment banking services. The 
preceding studies found that the boutiques are more 
used in small transactions and that the acquirers 
who avail of boutiques in acquisitions of listed 
companies manage to pay lower fees. However, this 
does not mean greater abnormal returns and in spite 
of the popularity of such advisors in recent years, 
there is no concrete evidence that a company can 
obtain benefits by choosing boutiques rather than 
investment banks which cover a wider range of 
services. Furthermore, another conclusion of the 
study is the fact that the fees requested by 
boutiques are in general about the same as those 
charged by traditional investment banks (Song and 
Wei, 2010). Recently, McConnell and Sibilkov (2016) 
find evidence that, when choosing their advisors, 
acquiring companies consider their reputation, thus 
reducing to some extent the possibility for the 
advisor themselves to struggle for deal completions 
and success fees, regardless of the value creation 
consequences for the acquirers’ stockholders. 
 
3. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKING ADVISORY 
SERVICES IN M&A DEALS 
 
There are many reasons why a company's 
management decides to undertake in M&A 
operations. One of the main reasons is expansion 
                                                          
14 The “boutiques” are independent companies, of relatively smaller size than 
traditional investment banks, and they focus on advisory services in specific 
sectors. They prefer operations of medium-small size and they are 
experienced and skilled in M&A. A particular feature of these companies is 
that "they do not sustain the financial management and risks of activities in 
their own name" (Forestieri, 2011). The most important names include 
Lazard (at least until 2005, the year of its listing), Rothschild and, of the 
Italian boutiques, Banca Leonardo. 
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(Gaughan, 2011). Company acquisitions therefore 
represent a way of pursuing growth, as an 
alternative to the strategic option of internal organic 
growth. In this regard, synergies are the main factors 
in the creation of value and they represent a decisive 
reason at the basis of M&A operations. The other 
determining factors for a company acquisition are 
the benefits that the buyers and sellers expect as the 
result of the M&A operation. Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987) describe how sellers sell when buyers 
make sufficiently attractive offers. The M&A activity 
is therefore often influenced by a number of factors. 
These include regulations, market dimensions, 
technological innovation, fluctuations in financial 
markets and financial innovations. Furthermore, 
stimuli, opportunities and risks which develop in the 
market can then become strategic options, sources 
of synergies, which determine the convenience of an 
operation (Capizzi, 2007).  
For the companies directly controlled, M&A can 
be of particular strategic relevance (Capizzi15, 2007). 
Considering the importance of such events, M&A 
activity is a critical element among the wide range of 
areas of competences touched by special 
underwriting operations and advisory services. As 
pointed out by Servaes and Zenner (1996), 
companies intending to acquire the control of 
another company usually take avail of an advisor 
when the transaction is perceived as complex and 
when the managers do not have the benefit of past 
experience gained from other acquisitions. 
The hypothesis underlying the decision to 
employ an investment bank is that these institutions 
should be able to help their customers to identify 
the best targets and to arrange the appropriate deal 
structure to increase the return for their customers. 
However, as seen in the literature (Fernando et al., 
2012; Megginson et al., 2014), some existing studies 
follow a different direction and do not point out any 
positive relationship between a bank's reputation 
and the buyer's performance (the most beaten track). 
Other results seem to support the hypothesis of a 
passive execution of operations, in which the banks 
do not supply real consultancy services with added 
value, but merely follow the instructions issued by 
the customer (Bao and Edmans, 2011). However, 
returning to the reasons for the demand for advisory 
services and leaving aside the arguments concerning 
the effective added value that may or may not be 
contributed by the activity of the investment banks – 
these questions will be answered further below – the 
general reasons for requesting an advisor can be 
classified under four main types (Capizzi, 2007a). 
The first type regards the financial broker's capacity 
to reduce the costs of a transaction within the 
corporate ownership and control reallocation market 
(Buongiorno and Conca, 2007). A second type relates 
to the existence of information asymmetries, which 
is a factor that increases the need for advice, given 
the superior ability and efficiency of financial 
brokers in obtaining, producing and managing 
information on relevant aspects related to which the 
interests of the counterparties engaged in a given 
transaction normally diverge. A third type of reason 
                                                          
15 Capizzi, V. (2007). Financial brokers and services in support of company 
acquisitions. In G. Forestieri (edited by) Corporate e investment banking, 4th 
edition, Milan, Egea: pp. 345-387. 
which justifies the need to employ an advisor 
pertains to the "certification effect" which the 
advisor can create.  The last type of reason derives 
instead from the context of the bank-broker 
relationships that cover different periods. As shown 
by some mentioned contributions, the fees for the 
advisory service performed to assist in the M&A 
operations often include a sort of "relationship fee" 
that is transferred to the investment bank that has 
already acted as an advisor for a given company in 
previous M&A operations (Capizzi, 2007a; McConnell 
and Sibilkov, 2016)16.  
Therefore, why are investment banks often 
necessary in special financing operations? The banks 
in question deal with the technical aspects of the 
transactions: they collect and process the available 
information on the companies involved in the 
transaction, they suggest the best options in terms 
of how to structure the operation, they assist their 
customer companies in negotiating the terms of the 
deal, and they give an opinion (a fairness opinion, if 
requested) on the suitability of the price negotiated. 
It is a question of information asymmetries: if a 
company were capable of interacting independently 
with financial market participants so that they could 
certify the quality of their own products (shares, 
bonds, etc.), the investment banks would have no 
reason to exist. Taking into account all the 
considerations expressed above, one can argue that 
the fundamental role of investment banks in the 
sphere of special financing operations is that of 
obtaining and processing the available information 
in order to certify the quality of the operation on the 
basis of their own experience and reputation. The 
higher the advisor's reputation, the greater the so-
called certification effect tends to be. 
 
4. THE "LEAGUE TABLES" OF THE INVESTMENT 
BANKS 
 
To get an idea of the actors present in the 
investment banking industry, one must look at the 
relevant "league tables". The "league tables" are 
investment bank classifications in a given business: 
classifications are available for M&A, IPO, bond issue 
operations, etc. The investment banks place great 
importance on league tables, since they are an 
important marketing and, therefore, origination tool. 
To obtain evidence of a bank's leadership in a 
certain sector/business, the only objective tool that 
can be used to verify whether the statements are 
correct or not are the league tables. One of the 
features of these tables is that they tend to be stable 
over the medium-long term, especially with regards 
to the top positions; in other words, the leading 
banks, i.e. those which have the highest reputations 
and market shares in the sector, are constantly 
placed in the top positions of the league tables. 
However, some changes have taken place as a result 
of the recent financial crisis, which made some large 
banks bankrupt (for example, Lehman Brothers) and 
which forced others to carry out deep 
reorganisations.  
With regard to technical aspects, it must be 
                                                          
16 Allen et al. (2004) have examined in depth the aspects of the so-called 
certification effect and of the customer-consultant relationship, and they 
have extended them to the "role" of the investment banks in M&A operations. 
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noted that there are normally three possible criteria 
according to which a league table is constructed17: 
the value of the operations (or deal values), 
commissions (or fees) and the number of operations. 
The most used criterion is deal value, which does 
not seem to provide the same incentives to conflict 
of interest behaviours than the other criteria18. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Research question 
 
Studies focused on the role of investment banks in 
M&A have traditionally highlighted the effect of the 
reputation of investment banks in producing greater 
yields for their clients involved in the transaction. 
This aptitude has been referred to separately as the 
ability for the banks with better reputations to 
arrange and structure M&A deals to increase the 
potential creation of value embedded in the 
operation – i.e. Superior Deal Hypothesis – and the 
certification role provided to the market about the 
feasibility of the operation – i.e. Certification Role.  
According to the Superior Deal theory, the 
banks with better reputations are able to offer to 
their clients services with higher added values 
(Ismail, 2011). Considering that the quality of the 
most important activities included in the investment 
banking services conducted depends critically on a 
bank's experience (Ma, 2006), the reason for the 
importance of the role of the league tables in 
measuring the value of the bank’s reputation can be 
understood. In addition, the bankers of top 
investment banks ought to have greater negotiating 
capacity thanks to their greater experience, and 
consequently better results for their customers. 
According to the Certification Role instead, the most 
prestigious investment banks, or those well 
positioned in the league table, should reduce the 
uncertainty about the deal with their presence, and 
at the same time, act to assure the market about the 
affective company quality.  
What we retain as worthy of investigation is to 
verify whether the role of the investment banks has 
changed, either for their clients or for the market, 
has changed and toward which direction before and 
after the Lehman collapse, a phenomenon generating 
a great deal of discontinuity in the capital markets 
and investment banking industry, as well as a 
valuable research opportunity (Fernando et al., 2012; 
Morrison et al., 2014). This research question comes 
from the different context in which the banks have 
been facing during these two time periods. 
Before the turmoil that followed after the credit 
crunch and Lehman default, the combination of high 
liquidity and low returns lead the investors to be 
more risk taking.  
It is plausible to affirm that in this context 
where investors are less risk adverse, the role of the 
investment banks was less crucial in certifying the 
quality of the operation or in selecting the 
counterparties and arranging the deal. 
                                                          
17 Important financial information providers, like Bloomberg or Thomson 
Reuters, which register and file the events on the financial markets in 
databases, allow for obtaining ad hoc league tables for pre-determined time 
periods and specific geographic areas. 
18 Source: Thomson Reuters SDC. 
Contrastingly, after the Lehman collapse, when 
the market passed from a bullish to a bearish phase, 
the interests and the expectations about the role of 
investment banks should have been strongest 
considering the more risk adverse behaviour of 
investors. 
In other words: in a context of increasing 
uncertainty and in which almost all the main players 
were involved in restructuring or rationalisation 
activities, the presence of a top tier investment bank 
would have confirmed the quality of the operation to 
the market, as well as of their participants, and in 
doing so have led to a better evaluation. 
According to this hypothesis, the aim of this 
paper is verify whether and how the role of 
investment banks has changed before and after the 
Lehman collapse and, also if the ability to create 
value for their clients can be confirmed. 
 
5.2. The dataset used 
 
A M&A transactions sample has been collected over 
a period of 8 years, from 15th September 2004 to 
15th September 2012. For the purposes of the 
analysis, the time frame has been divided into two 
symmetrical parts: the 4 years before and the 4 
years after 15th September 200819. The choice of 
these two periods was made to make the periods 
observed more similar and more comparable. The 
data were collected from a financial data provider 
Thomson One Investment Banking (Thomson 
Reuters) system with regard to M&A operations 
announced and completed among companies located 
in the following Western European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Holland, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (the same 18 
countries considered by the STOXX Europe 600 
Index, which is the market index which has been 
taken as a benchmark, as will be indicated further 
below).  
The choice of focusing the analysis on the 
European market lies in the different evaluation 
about the role played by investment banks: the less 
the experience and tradition of M&A activity a 
market has, the more the importance and 
contribution offered by top tier investment banks 
appointed as advisor tends to be. 
We believe that for these kinds of markets, 
except for the UK, the importance of a leading 
investment bank is more pronounced than in 
markets with a strong experience and history of 
M&A deals, such as the North American one. In fact, 
in a “market” that suffers for a lack of knowledge 
about this kind of operations, the Certification Role 
ensured by a top tier investment banks is perceived 
in a stronger way than in comparison to more 
experienced markets and, thus, significantly valued 
by corporate clients.   
Investment bans’ presence in such countries is 
relevant for both the target and the acquirer. The 
initial sample was expanded by applying additional 
selection criteria, in order to obtain a dataset with 
features appropriate for the analysis carried out. In 
                                                          
19 Date when Lehman Brothers was placed under bankruptcy protection. 
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particular, the following transactions were excluded: 
those with a deal value below €1 m; those in which 
the target and acquirer were both not listed; those 
which regarded shares representing less than 5% of 
the target's total equity.  In addition, wishing to pay 
greater attention to transactions implying the 
transfer of control, the only operations considered 
were those in which the acquirer held less than 50% 
of the shares initially and more than 50% of the 
shares afterwards. Then in view of the fact that the 
purpose of the analysis was to study the relationship 
between the results of the operation and the 
advisor's reputation, all the transactions in which 
the provider did not give any indication of an 
advisor were also excluded. This information may 
have been concealed for the sake of confidentiality, 
where the terms of the operation and/or the 
consultants involved were not disclosed, or it may 
have been because the companies chose not to take 
avail of external consultants. Explicit reference is 
made in the literature to such operations, defining 
them as "in-house deals" (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Lastly, to avoid distortions in the results due to the 
particular economic situation in the more recent of 
the two periods observed, all operations involving 
targets or acquirers belonging to the financial 
services sector were also eliminated from the 
sample.  
 
5.2.1. Investment Bank Classification 
 
The literature offers various indications for 
measuring the reputation of investment banks20. 
Consistently with the arguments previously 
developed, in this paper we select the market share 
held by investment banks as a good proxy for the 
reputation and quality. More in detail, we compute 
the accumulated counter value of the deals followed 
as a percentage of the total value of the deals in a 
given geographic area over a specific time frame.  
To classify the investment banks for the 
purposes of this analysis, two methods have been 
followed, one of which was used as the control 
method. The first is based on the rankings which can 
be obtained directly from the financial data 
provider, Thomson Reuters, while the second 
method is more linked to the particular 
physiognomy of the transactions sample used for 
the empirical analysis. Since the research focused on 
Western Europe, the annual rankings were 
downloaded from the Thomson Reuters' M&A 
League Tables section, based on the accumulated 
deal values of the operations announced in each 
year within the sample time frame. Placing the 
positions in order of size, an absolute investment 
                                                          
20 Megginson and Weiss (1991), in their work concerning IPO operations, 
considered the effective market share, while Bowers and Miller (1990) and 
Servaes and Zenner (1996), also on the basis of the market share, divided the 
banks into two groups: top tier (the first 5 banks20 ) and second tier (all the 
others) depending on the market share of the corporate control market in 
the period of the sample used. Rau (2000) instead considered three 
reputation levels. Alternatively, Carter and Manaster (1990), regarding IPO 
operations, deduced the reputation of the investment banks from their 
positions in the tombstones20 shown in the financial daily newspapers. 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) have shown that the market share 
(understood as a continuous variable), the three-level classification, and the 
classification deduced by the tombstones, are closely linked as far as the IPO 
market is concerned. 
bank classification can be drawn up21. Table 1 shows 
the first twenty banks22. 
The first ten banks are identified as top 
investment banks. In the Table 2, each investment 
bank present in the sample of transactions has been 
accredited the deal value of every transaction in 
which it has participated in. If one of the companies 
(whether target or acquirer) involved in the 
operation has taken avail of several advisors 
simultaneously, the deal value of the transaction is 
attributed to all the advisors involved. The bank 
which has obtained the highest cumulative deal 
value has then been assigned first place, that with 
the second highest deal value has been placed 
second, and so forth on down to the bank which has 
given its assistance for the lowest cumulative value. 
This procedure has produced the following results 
in Table 2.  
To avoid distortions due to the particular 
choices made during the selection phase and when 
constructing the transactions sample, and to obtain 
a more absolute and objective assessment of the 
reputation of the investment banks, the first method 
was chosen, which derives from a general 
consideration of the entire M&A market in Western 
Europe. 
 
5.2.2. Descriptive analysis of the sample 
 
Following the selection criteria outlined in section 
5.2.1, a sample of sufficiently similar M&A 
operations was obtained. After a few small 
modifications which were made due to the particular 
needs of the empirical analysis (elimination of the 
observations corresponding to the maximum and 
minimum CARs (Kale et al., 2003)), the final sample 
was composed of 229 observations. In particular, 
these observations are divided into 68 transactions 
announced after the date of the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy and 161 transactions announced before 
the bankruptcy. The difference in terms of the 
number of transactions between one period and 
another gives an idea of the decrease in the activity 
which was typical immediately after the bankruptcy 
and in the period of the financial crisis in general.  
Dividing targets and acquirers according to the 
macro sector (or macro industry23) to which they 
belong, it can be observed that the companies of our 
sample are distributed among various sectors and 
that the M&A activity in each sector differs between 
the two periods considered (Table 3). It can be 
noted, in particular, that in the four years before the 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy, transactions involving
                                                          
21 The first-tier investment banks are those in the first ten positions, and the 
second-tier investment banks are all the other classified after the tenth 
position (Ismail, 2010). The terms first-tier and top-tier are used indistinctly 
in this paper work and have the same meaning. 
22 For informative purposes, the positions adopted by the various advisors in 
each year are shown, as reported by Thomson Reuters. 
23 The division according to the sector to which the companies belong has 
been based on the macro industry classification provided by Thomson 
Reuters. More specifically following the terminology of the financial data 
provider, the companies of our sample are divided among eleven sectors:  
Energy and Power (ENERGY); Industrial (IND); High Technology (HT); 
Telecommunications (TELECOM); Retail (RETAIL); Healthcare (HEALTH); 
Media and Entertainment (MEDIA); Real Estate (REALEST); Materials 
(MATERLS); Consumer Products and Services (CPS); Consumer Staples 
(STAPLES). 
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Table 1. Investment Banks: ranking (league table) 
 
Advisor 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Average 
position 
Rank # 
Goldman Sachs 1 1 1 7 5 1 2 1 2 2,3 1 
Morgan Stanley 2 2 2 3 3 4 1 4 5 2,9 2 
Deutsche Bank 3 3 3 2 8 6 10 6 7 5,3 3 
JP Morgan 6 8 7 6 1 7 6 2 6 5,4 4 
Citi 9 10 10 4 4 2 4 7 3 5,9 5 
Rothschild 10 4 5 8 11 8 5 5 1 6,3 6 
UBS 14 6 12 1 2 5 8 9 13 7,8 7 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 15 13 14 11 6 3 3 3 4 8,0 8 
Credit Suisse 7 11 4 5 7 9 11 12 12 8,7 9 
BNP Paribas 5 16 8 12 10 11 7 8 9 9,6 10 
Lazard 12 9 6 9 9 15 9 15 10 10,4 11 
Nomura 8 15 15 23 15 10 12 10 16 13,8 12 
HSBC 19 7 11 18 20 21 13 14 19 15,8 13 
Societe Generale 17 5 9 15 12 26 15 22 29 16,7 14 
Credit Agricole 13 12 17 21 19 24 14 13 30 18,1 15 
Mediobanca 21 21 26 16 16 14 20 18 14 18,4 16 
RBS 37 31 20 13 23 12 16 16 8 19,6 17 
UniCredit 42 19 19 24 25 23 37 21 15 25,0 18 
Santander 39 34 37 25 18 13 22 35 24 27,4 19 
Leonardo & Co 35 22 33 26 26 25 17 19 46 27,7 20 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2004-2012) 
 
Table 2. Investment Banks: deal value 
 
Advisor Deal value (€m) Rank # 
Morgan Stanley 149.172 1 
Goldman Sachs 129.131 2 
JP Morgan 128.928 3 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 107.782 4 
Citi 104.063 5 
UBS 97.319 6 
Credit Suisse 86.064 7 
Deutsche Bank 79.422 8 
BNP Paribas 61.722 9 
Lazard 56.506 10 
HSBC 39.757 11 
ABN-AMRO 39.647 12 
Rothschild 36.958 13 
Societe Generale 36.847 14 
Santander 25.772 15 
Greenhill&Co 20.707 16 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 18.897 17 
Lehman Brothers Internetional 14.410 18 
Perella Weinberg Partners 13.722 19 
Credit Agricole 12.194 20 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
targets in the high technology (HT) sector were 
predominant, while in the successive four years this 
type of transaction decreased sharply (87.5% fewer), 
going from 40 (pre Lehman) to 5 (post Lehman) 
acquisitions of high-tech companies. Comparing the 
two periods, a particular fall can also be seen in 
transactions aimed at acquiring consumer goods 
(CPS and STAPLES).  The fall in activity is greater in 
the case of companies which produce the so-called 
'consumer staples', i.e. consumer goods which are 
not cyclical, which are primary, like food and 
beverages. In this case, the analysis of our sample 
shows a change from 13 to 2 acquisitions of 
companies belonging to this sector (a fall of about 
85%). An explanation for this tendency can be found 
in the general reduction of consumptions at the 
macro level which may have slowed down the 
growth of the sectors connected, in particular, to the 
income available and to individuals' tendency to 
consume. On the contrary, a certain equilibrium can 
be seen in the M&A operations for the acquisition of 
companies in the Energy and Power sector or the 
Health Care sector (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Macro Industry 
 
Macro Industry 
Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Full-Period 
Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers 
Energy 11 12 9 9 20 21 
IND 18 21 13 14 31 35 
HT 40 28 5 6 45 34 
Telecom 7 18 4 3 11 21 
Retail 9 11 4 4 13 15 
Health 11 9 9 7 20 16 
Media 10 12 3 6 13 18 
Realest 9 8 5 5 14 13 
Materls 16 16 9 9 25 25 
CPS 17 16 5 2 22 18 
Staples 13 10 2 3 15 13 
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Analysing Table 4, it can be seen that, on 
average, there are more companies which do not 
avail of a first tier advisor than those which do. 
However, since we have classified only ten 
investment banks as first tier advisors, it is in any 
case surprising to note that, during the entire time 
frame, these are taken into consideration by targets 
in 41% of cases and by acquirers in 46% of cases. 
Observing Table 4 in detail, it is also curious to 
notice that while the request for first tier banks on 
the part of buyer companies has remained stable in 
both the pre-Lehman and the post-Lehman periods, 
the request on the part of target companies for 
advisors with a high reputation decreased 
considerably after the bankruptcy (when the 
financial crisis was spreading uncontrollably). In 
particular, compared to an average of 41% over the 
entire time frame of eight years, only 29% of the 68 
target companies of the sample in the post Lehman 
period sought support from a top advisor. One 
explanation for this phenomenon could be the need, 
due to the particular economic situation, to employ 
consultants who required relatively much lower fees 
(this is the hypothesis underlying the theory of 
Saunders and Srinivan (2001), according to whom 
the top advisors generally ask for much higher fees 
than the second tier advisors). However, this motive 
does not explain why the same phenomenon does 
not also appear in the case of bidders (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Sample distribution 
 
 Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Entire period 
Targets with a top-tier advisor 75 20 95 
% 47% 29% 41% 
Targets without a top-tier advisor 86 48 134 
% 53% 71% 59% 
Acquirers with a top-tier advisor 76 29 105 
% 47% 43% 46% 
Acquirers without a top-tier advisor 85 39 124 
% 53% 57% 54% 
 
To conclude, the features of the sample in 
terms of operations size, using the deal values of the 
same as proxy, can now be observed. It can be seen 
from Table 5, that in the four years after the Lehman 
crash, the dimensions of the transactions of our 
sample were considerably smaller than those of the 
"pre-crisis" period. The average deal value fell from 
€1,606m before the crash to €466m after the crash. 
This enormous difference can be explained by the 
fact that after the crash (in the period of the global 
financial crisis) the maximum sizes of transactions 
throughout the whole world decreased considerably. 
It can be seen from the “Maximum” column in “Table 
5” that the sample considered for the purpose of the 
research shows this trend inversion.  The largest 
transaction before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
(and before panic spread through financial markets), 
had a deal value of €26,225 m against a deal value of 
€3,416m for the largest transaction of the sample 
from after 15 September 2008.  
 
Table 5. Sample data: descriptive statistics 
 
Period N 
Descriptive statistics (€m) 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Range 
Pre Lehman 161 1,606 228 2 26,225 26,223 
Post Lehman 68 466 134 2 3,416 3,414 
Entire period 229 1,267 189 2 26,225 26,223 
 
Furthermore, considering the dimensions of the 
deals and the presence or absence of top tier 
advisors, it can be seen that first tier investment 
banks are more engaged in relatively larger 
transactions on both the sell-side and the buy-side. 
Consider the following Table 6 and Table 7, for 
target and bidder companies respectively. The tables 
show that this pattern, according to which the top-
tier banks are used in transactions of greater 
dimensions, holds firm in all the time frames 
considered. For the target companies in general 
(without considering the division between the two 
periods), a top advisor has given consultancy 
services in transactions with an average deal value 
of €2,756m while it was not engaged (or did not 
agree to offer its services) in the relatively smaller 
transactions, at an average deal value of €212m. The 
table also confirms the conclusions on the diversity 
of the transactions in the two symmetrical time 
periods. The average value of the operations that 
were assisted by a top investment bank decreases 
from €3,198m in the pre-crash period to €1,095m in 
the post-crash period. A similar phenomenon can 
also be seen with respect of the bidders. In general, 
they also employ top investment banks for 
transactions of relatively greater size. In detail with 
reference to the entire time frame covered by the 
sample, it can be seen that the average value of the 
deals assisted by at least one top-tier investment 
bank is €2,366m against an average deal value of 
€337m for transactions carried out without the 
services of a top investment bank. 
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Table 6. Sell-side deal value descriptive statistics (€m) 
 
Sell-side deal value descriptive statistics (€m) 
Pre-Lehman 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 217 
Median 88 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 2.711 
Range 2.709 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 3.198 
Median 837 
Minimum 18 
Maximum 26.225 
Range 26.207 
Post-Lehman 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 204 
Median 64 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 2.822 
Range 2.820 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 1.095 
Median 644 
Minimum 25 
Maximum 3.416 
Range 3.392 
Entire period 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 212 
Median 76 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 2.822 
Range 2.820 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 2.756 
Median 809 
Minimum 18 
Maximum 26.225 
Range 26.207 
 
Table 7. Buy side deal value descriptive statistics (€m) 
 
Buy side deal value descriptive statistics (€m) 
Pre-Lehman 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 410 
Median 104 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 16,910 
Range 16,908 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 2,944 
Median 802 
Minimum 14 
Maximum 26,225 
Range 26,211 
Post-Lehman 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 178 
Median 62 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 2,012 
Range 2,010 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 853 
Median 357 
Minimum 6 
Maximum 3,416 
Range 3,411 
Entire period 
No top-tier advisor 
Mean 337 
Median 88 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 16,910 
Range 16,908 
With top-tier advisor 
Mean 2,366 
Median 671 
Minimum 6 
Maximum 26,225 
Range 26,220 
In addition, it can be seen that the re-sizing of 
the deal values between the pre-Lehman crash 
period and the post-Lehman crash period is also 
confirmed by the analysis of the buyer companies. 
However, it is curious to note that this difference in 
average deal size is not so evident for those carried 
out without the services of a top advisor. This 
confirms the hypothesis according to which 
companies are more inclined to request the 
assistance of a top investment bank in complex M&A 
operations of relatively higher sizes (Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996). 
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5.3. The event study methodology 
 
This section focuses on the description of the event 
study approach. This is an analysis method which, 
by examining the changes in share prices, allows for 
estimating the impact generated by a specific 
corporate event. In this context, the term "event" 
refers to a fact or piece of information which if 
made public can significantly alter the value of a 
listed company. The use of this method is based on 
the fact that the occurrence of an abnormal share 
price performance, measured around the time of a 
certain company event, can help us to assess the 
impact that this certain event will have on the wealth 
of the shareholders of the company involved 
(Kothari and Warner, 2007). According to the 
efficient markets hypothesis, prices reflect all the 
information publicly available on a particular asset 
(Fama, 1970). As far as this analysis is concerned, all 
the observations considered regarding the sample 
correspond to events (M&A announcements) that 
take place at different moments: the first public 
announcement of a certain M&A operation is the 
most suitable moment to measure the impact 
(Halpern, 1983). It is worth remembering that 
abnormal returns exist and that they can be 
measured even before the effective announcement, 
usually because of leaks of confidential information 
and/or because the market itself gives advance 
notice of the event (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). 
However, since the market cannot entirely predict an 
event, an abnormal share price trend can be 
observed and can therefore be ascribed to the event 
itself. 
The standard method followed is divided into 
several steps: a) definition of the event of interest 
and identification of the time period (the so-called 
event window) over which to examine the impact 
that the event has had on the share prices; estimate 
of the expected return; b) calculation of the 
abnormal return; c) verification of the zero 
hypothesis and d) interpretation of results. 
Before describing the method which will lead to 
the final result, it is necessary to clarify two basic 
concepts: 
 estimation window: the period of time over 
which to estimate the normal market return. This 
period is prior to the event, to avoid the 
announcement influencing the estimate of the 
parameters; 
 event window: the period of time, including at 
least the day of the event, over which to examine the 
impact that the said event has had on the share 
price. 
To check the existence of abnormal returns, a 
benchmark24 for normal returns (not influenced by a 
particular event) is necessary and it must be defined 
correctly. In fact, many models for estimating 
expected returns can be found in the literature 
                                                          
24 The STOXX Europe 600 Index was chosen as the benchmark, a sub-group 
of the STOXX Global 1800 Index. With a fixed number of 600 components, 
the STOXX Europe 600 Index represents a series of companies with small, 
medium and large equities, located within the following 18 European 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Holland, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (Source: www.stoxx.com). 
Furthermore, the choice of benchmark which includes all the sectors was 
based upon the descriptive analysis on the mixed nature of the data sample.. 
associated with event study methodology. The 
precision of the abnormal returns has been found to 
differ according to the alternative methods. 
However, an extensive study of the literature on the 
different methods has allowed for underlining the 
properties and the advantages and disadvantages of 
each method. The literature concentrates in 
particular on two models: the constant mean return 
model and the market model. The first presumes 
that the average return on the security is constant 
over time; the second associates the return on the 
financial instrument with the return on the relative 
market portfolio and it is based on the assumption 
of the normality of the returns. Several authors 
(Panayides and Gong, 2002; Davidson, Dutia and 
Cheng, 1989) have demonstrated that the market 
model gives the more accurate measurement of 
abnormal returns. Considering that the event of 
interest in our analysis is the announcement of a 
corporate merger or takeover that takes place on a 
specific identifiable day, the event study is based on 
a daily data frequency (Brown and Warner, 1985)25. 
With regard to the estimation26 of the parameters α 
(alpha) and β (beta) for the company in question, an 
estimation window prior to the event (the 
announcement of the operation) was used in order 
to avoid excessive contamination deriving from the 
effects of possible rumours on the event. Beta - 
which expresses the behaviour of a security in 
respect of the market of reference - in statistical 
terms is the angular coefficient of the straight line 
of the regression of the return on the equity 
instrument, compared to the return of the market 
index used as the benchmark. A beta of 1 indicates 
that the security moves perfectly in line with the 
market of reference, whereas a beta of more than 1 
indicates an aggressive security that tends to move 
more than the market, and a beta of less than 1 
indicates a more conservative security that is 
particularly insensitive to market movements and 
has less marked volatility than the market (Allen, 
Brealey, Myers and Sandri, 2007). The beta 
coefficient (β) measures the aptitude of a security to 
vary according to the market (systematic risk) while 
the alpha (α), which intercepts the straight line of the 
regression, expresses the aptitude of a security to 
vary independently of the market (specific risk). In 
order to calculate the parameters, an estimation 
window of 150 days was used, from 170 to 20 days 
before the event date (date of the announcement) 
except in some special cases in which the period was 
reduced by a few days because of the lack of 
financial data. This occurred because the companies 
involved in certain M&A deals were still not listed 
when the financial data were taken. In addition, 
careful attention was paid to check that during the 
estimation window, the companies in question had 
not undertaken or had not been subjected to other 
extraordinary operations. In fact, those which 
presented this flaw were eliminated from the 
sample.  
                                                          
25 The objection generally raised, when one decides to opt for this choice, is 
that the daily returns are not normal. The fact that the returns are 
distributed in a Gaussian manner is in fact at the basis of the event study 
methodology. 
26 For the application of this methodology, it is necessary to estimate the 
parameters by using ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
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The first step in the execution of the analysis 
was to construct a regression between the returns 
on a specific security i and the returns of the market 
index m (the STOXX Europe 600 Index). The angular 
coefficient,  ̂
i
, is the value of the beta while  ̂
i
 is the 
interception point, on the ordinates axis of the 
regression straight line. Assuming a constant beta 
for a given security i, we calculate the expected 
return on the security i for every day of the event 
window according to the following equation: 
 
 ̅
it 
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i 
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where,  ̅
it  
is the expected return27 at time t, R
mt  
is the daily return of the market index m at time t,  ̂
i 
and  ̂
i
 are the regression parameters. 
The effective yield of a security i is defined as: 
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Therefore, abnormal return is defined as the 
difference between the effective return on a security 
i (R
 it
), observed on the market at a particular time t 
(and conditioned by the particular event), and its 
expected return  ̅
it 
at time t (not influenced by the 
event). Therefore, the abnormal return on a security 
i at time t is given by the equation: 
     
  
it 
   
it
 –  ̅
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where,  
it
 is the actual return on the security i 
at time t.  
The abnormal return can be considered as the 
direct occurrence of the unexpected difference in 
the shareholders' wealth associated with the event. 
The cumulative abnormal return on a security i 
results from the sum of the daily abnormal returns 
observed over a given period (event window) [     ]: 
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The average abnormal return is the average of 
the abnormal returns calculated for each 
observation, for every day t of the event window: 
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The average of the CARS, however, is defined as 
cumulative average abnormal returns:  
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In this study, the calculation of CARs is based 
on an event window of five days (Ismail, 2010; 
Golubov et al., 2012). These five days include: the 
two days before the announcement, the day of the 
announcement (time zero) and the two days after 
the announcement (-2; +2). The need to include data 
prior to the announcement is linked to the 
possibility of rumours which can influence the 
                                                          
27 It is important to note that the expected return on the shares has been 
estimated starting from the time frame of reference, used for the estimate of 
the parameters, which goes from 170 to 20 days before the event. A 
common mistake in studies of this type is to estimate the parameters through 
a regression including the date of the event and to then calculate the 
abnormal returns on the basis of those estimates. This non-rigorous method 
would underestimate the abnormal returns. 
returns on the shares28. The data after the 
announcement instead, are justified by the possible 
presence of a time lag between the announcement 
and the market reaction.  
Moreover, as proposed in other research 
conducted using the event study methodology (Note 
19), we opted for an enlarged Estimation Window (-5; 
+5). This choice comes from two different reasons: 
on one hand a (-2; +2) Estimation Window is more 
suitable for the American market rather than for the 
European one. Maintaining this period even for the 
European Market would have obliged us to verify the 
efficiency level of both markets. This kind of 
research falls outside the aim of this research. On 
the other hand, an enlarged Estimation Window 
allows us to verify the robustness of the test 
conducted.  
To check that the resulting CARs are 
statistically different to zero (i.e. significant from a 
statistical viewpoint), the statistical t-test and its p-
value are used. The study intends to verify, i.e. the 
case of zero H
0
 (the Null Hypothesis) is: 
                 
                
By the identification of the p-value, it is then 
established whether the null hypothesis can be 
rejected or not. In the case in question, it was 
decided to refuse the null hypothesis if the p-value 
was below 5%, accepting the risk of committing a 
prima specie error (refusing the zero hypothesis 
when it is true) with a probability of 5%. When the p-
value is below that threshold, it can be said that the 
average of the CARs is not statically different from 
zero. 
 
5.4. Results 
 
We will now go on to analyse the results of the event 
study and statistical tests29. First of all, in 
accordance with Kale et al. (2003), in order to limit 
the influence of particular outliers, the observations 
corresponding to the extreme values (maximum and 
minimum) in terms of CARs, were eliminated from 
the sample. In general within the previous literature, 
a positive effect was found for the target, while the 
market reaction for the acquirer was negative or 
insignificant. According to the literature, positive 
and significant average CARs were observed for the 
targets, while CARs observed for the bidder 
companies were in general not significantly different 
from zero.  In the case in point however, it is curious 
to notice what happens when we test the zero 
hypothesis considering different time frames 
(respectively pre and post Lehman). First of all, if 
one considers the entire time frame of our sample 
(all of the 229 observations), a strong positive and 
statistically significant return can be seen for the 
targets, while the result for the buyer companies is 
not statistically significant (Table 8). We can see in 
particular that for the event window (-2; +2) the 
targets exhibit on average, a cumulative return of 
14.90% with a p-value equal to 0.000. The average 
return for the acquirers instead does not differ from 
zero and the p-value (equal to 0.251) conforms to 
the zero hypothesis, namely that the CARs do not 
differ statistically from zero (Table 8). 
                                                          
28 This evidence derives from previous literature: Bradley (1980) shows that 
the market reaction can be perceived up to ten days before the 
communication to the public. 
29 The test was carried out using SPSS software. 
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Table 8. Cumulative Abnormal Return statistics 
 
Full Period 
Window (-2; +2) t p value 
Car Target 14,898 0,000 
Car Acquirer (0,297) 0,405 
Window (-5; +5) t p value 
Car Target 15,532 0,002 
Car Acquirer (0,120) 0,450 
Pre-Lehman default 
Window (-2; +2) t p value 
Car Target 14,186 0,000 
Car Acquirer 0,000 0,979 
Window (-5; +5) t p value 
Car Target 14,812 0,456 
Car Acquirer 0,013 0,040 
Post-Lehman default 
Window (-2; +2) t p value 
Car Target 16,580 0,000 
Car Acquirer (1,418) 0,037 
Window (-5; +5) t p value 
Car Target 17,562 0,478 
However, if we consider the sample of 
observations divided into the two time frames we 
obtain different results. It must be remembered that 
the 229 observations were divided into 161 pre-
crash observations and 68 post-crash observations. 
With regard to the targets however, the results are 
not very different. The CARs are strongly positive on 
average and significant for both time frames. In 
spite of this, it can be noted that the average returns 
are slightly higher in the post-crash period (Table 8) 
and slightly lower in the pre-crash period (Table 8). 
This could be interpreted by supposing that greater 
prudence was exercised in the period of the crisis 
when undertaking M&A operations, when greater 
prudence would have led to more in-depth 
assessments and a greater selection in favour of 
deals that guaranteed greater synergies. However, 
such conclusions cannot be drawn in respect of 
buyer companies. It can be seen that the p-values 
prior to the crash are extremely high for this group, 
and then fall considerably after the crash, ending up 
below the 5% level (p-value equal to 0.037).  In this 
case, the resulting average CAR is negative, equal to 
1.42%, and statistically significant (Table 8).  
The results of the model can also be analysed 
from another viewpoint. In particular, the average 
CARs and the respective significances are shown 
below, after segmenting the sample according to 
whether the observations correspond to deals with 
the assistance of first-tier banks or not (Table 9). On 
average, the targets assisted by first-tier investment 
banks show a better performance. More specifically, 
the abnormal cumulative average return for the 
targets goes from 13.56%, without a top advisor, to 
16.79% when there is at least one top advisor (always 
with a p-value equal to 0.000). On the buy-side 
instead, the p-values obtained are always above the 
significance threshold of 5%. However, we can 
consider the CARs of the bidders which are not 
assisted by a top advisor within the limits, where the 
p-value is only slightly above the 5% threshold. In 
this case, the cumulative abnormal return is negative 
and equal to -0.93% (with a p-value of 0.051). Lastly, 
it can only be noted indicatively that the CAR is on 
average positive in the case of the presence of a first 
tier investment bank, although without significance 
statistically, and negative and statistically significant 
otherwise. The result according to which the 
cumulative abnormal returns are on average 
negative for acquirers which do not employ a top 
advisor is in contrast with Srinivasan (1999), who 
finds the opposite , although this is in agreement 
with many other studies present in the literature. On 
the other hand, unfortunately the p-value does not 
enable us to make significant conclusions for the 
opposite scenario. 
 
Table 9. Cumulative Abnormal Return with or without the presence of a Top Tier Investment Bank 
 
Without a Top Tier Investment Bank With a Top Tier Investment Bank 
Window (-2; +2) T p value Window (-2; +2) t p value 
Car Target  13,558 0,000 Car Target 16,787 0,000 
Car Acquirer (0,933) 0,051 Car Acquirer 0,456 0,390 
However, these single-varied comparisons can 
be misleading since they do not take into 
consideration any other variable except advisor 
reputation. As can be seen in the section on the 
description of the sample for example, it comes to 
light that top tier advisors tend to be used for the 
larger sized transactions. Therefore, both firm-
specific and deal-specific variables must be taken 
into consideration in order to check the effective 
influence of the "reputation" variable on the 
dependent variable of our interest (the abnormal 
return). In this regard, multivariate standard 
regression models have been developed (see the next 
section).  
5.5. Regression models 
 
The relationships between the advisor's reputation, 
the bidders' CARs and the acquirers' CARs, are 
examined below using multivariate regression 
models30. 
The equation used for this analysis is reported 
below. 
 
                                                          
30 Multi-varied OLS. 
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                                                            (7) 
 
 
A central point of the analysis consists in 
comparing the models obtained for targets and for 
acquirers. With regard to the dependent variable, 
CARs were utilised, expressed in percentage form 
and calculated over a time horizon of five days 
corresponding to the event window (-2;+2) (Ismail, 
2010; Golubov et al., 2012). With regard to the 
independent variables, it may be noted that in all 
regression models the same independent variables 
have been included, both for the analysis concerning 
the targets and for the analysis regarding the 
acquirer companies. This choice was made to make 
the analysis more homogeneous and to test the 
bank's/advisor's reputation variable specifically, 
which is hypothesised as significant regardless of 
whether the analysis is made on the targets or on 
the acquirers. The independent variables considered 
are illustrated below:  
 Top-Tier: this is the variable of greatest 
interest in this study. It is a dummy variable which 
assumes a value of one when an investment bank, 
that has assisted a company in a transaction 
included in the sample, is placed within the first ten 
positions of the investment bank classification. It 
can be noted that when more than one bank 
participates in the same transaction, the variable 
assumes a value equal to one unit if at least one of 
the banks falls within the definition of a first tier 
investment bank; 
 Same Industry: this is a dummy variable 
which takes on the value of one when the target and 
bidder are involved in a particular special financing 
operation and when they both operate in the same 
macro sector (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995); 
 Cross-Border: this is a dummy variable which 
takes on a value of one when the target and bidder 
are not located in the same country (Allen et al., 
2004; Doukas and Travlos,1988; Kang, 1993); 
 Tot Advisors: variable which corresponds to 
the total number of investment banks which are 
involved in the deal assisting either the target or 
acquirer (Iannotta, 2010); 
 Deal Value: the value of the transaction. This 
is a continuous variable. Like the preceding variable, 
the deal value can also indicate the complexity of 
the operation. Transactions of relatively greater size 
are considered within the literature as more 
complex; 
 Toehold: this variable is a dummy which 
assumes a value of one when the acquirer already 
holds at least 5% of the target before the acquisition 
of a controlling stake (Ismail, 2010); 
 Top vs Not: this variable, the only one which 
assumes different values according to whether the 
model refers to the behaviour of the target rather 
than the acquirer, is a dummy variable which is 
given the value of one when one of the 
counterparties has at least one top tier advisor while 
the other has only second tier advisors. When both 
counterparties have at least one first tier advisor, 
the variable is given the value of zero. 
 Relative Size: this is the ratio of the total 
assets of the target against the total assets of the 
bidder (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000); 
 Cash: this is a dummy variable given the 
value of one when the payment does not include 
shares (Travlos, 1987; Ismail, 2010). The reaction of 
the market is therefore considered better in the case 
of payments in cash. One explanation is that cash 
deals are usually associated with the issue of debt, 
which is an incentive for the management to be 
more disciplined; 
 Stock: a variable dummy which takes on the 
value of one when the acquisition is carried out by 
means of a share swap (Ismail, 2010; Iannotta 2010). 
 
5.5.1. Results 
 
For both types of companies involved in a merger or 
a takeover, verification was carried out as to whether 
the creation of value at the announcement of the 
M&A deal, was linked to the reputation of the 
investment bank acting as advisor for the deal and 
how this phenomenon varies between the period 
before31 and after32 the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
The proxy of the considered creation of value, the 
dependent variable, corresponds to cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), calculated according to the 
market model methodology, over a time window of 
five days (Ismail, 2010; Golubov et al., 2012).  
 
5.5.2. Results for the target 
 
The regression model corresponding to the pre-
Lehman crash period (Table 10) is composed of 161 
observations and 10 independent variables. The R2 
of 15.7% and the model as a whole is highly 
significant. The F test, which measures the 
relationship between all the variables selected and 
the dependent variable has an associated p-value of 
almost zero (0.003). Analysing the significance of 
the variables, it can be observed that only three of 
the ten variables considered are significant,  Stock, 
Toehold and Cross-Border, respectively significant at 
the 1%, 5% and, within the limits of acceptability, at 
the 10% levels. The negative coefficient of the Stock 
variable, in line with Ismail (2010), indicates that 
acquisitions financed by shares result in lower 
returns for the shareholders of the company 
acquired. The negative coefficient of the dummy 
variable Toehold indicates that the presence of a 
toehold, i.e. already owning some of the equity of 
the target company, reinforces the buyer company's 
position in the negotiating phase. This can depend 
on the fact that the toehold, favouring a greater 
availability of information, reduces possible 
problems of information asymmetries and allows 
the buyer to reach a better and more correct 
evaluation of the target. 
                                                          
31 The four-year period goes from 15/09/2004 to 15/09/2008, the day on 
which the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy procedure was opened. 
32 This time frame of 4 years again, goes from 15/09/2008, the day on which 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy procedure was opened, until 15/09/2012. 
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Table 10. Target CAR: the regression model 
corresponding to the pre-Lehman crash period 
 
R2 
 
0.157 
Significativity 
 
0.003* 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.157 
Parameter  Significativity 
(Constant) 0.177 0 
Top-Tier (0.002) 0.953 
Same Industry 0.001 0.963 
Cross-Border 0.049 0.078** 
Toehold (0.075) 0.046* 
Deal Value (0.000) 0.938 
Tot Advisors (0.002) 0.827 
Relative Size 0.006 0.602 
Stock (0.109) 0.007* 
Cash 0.002 0.967 
Top vs Not 0.002 0.97 
* Level of significativity from 1 to 5% 
** Level of significativity up to 10% 
 
Lastly, it must also be pointed out that the 
multivariate regression relative to the time frame 
prior to the Lehman collapse shows no evidence 
indicating that the identity and reputation of the 
investment bank is an important variable in 
determining the market reaction and the consequent 
creation of value for the target on the announcement 
of M&A deals. However, the results of the post-
Lehman regression model (Table 11)33 are different, 
and in fact show an inverse scenario. Above all it is 
to be noted that the R2 considerably improves, 
reaching 28.1%. With the increase in R2, the adjusted 
R2 has also increase, albeit to a lesser extent, from 
10.1% to 15.5%. Considering that the number of 
variables does not change, the less than proportional 
increase of the R2 could derive from the fewer 
observations on which the new model is based upon 
(the sample relative to the post-bankruptcy period 
is, in fact, composed of only 68 observations). The p-
value associated with the F test increases slightly but 
it nevertheless remains below the 5% threshold. 
Having said this, it is important to underline that in 
this new scenario the model indicates a strongly 
positive and significant effect of the investment 
bank's reputation (the advisor's reputation) on the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target. 
More specifically, with an error probability of 0.4% 
(p-value associated to the t-test equal to 0.004), the 
coefficient of the Top-Tier variable indicates that the 
presence of at least one top tier bank among the 
target's advisors contributes to increasing the wealth 
of the latter's shareholders by about 22.7%34. With 
reference to the same time window as that 
considered in the regression model, the targets 
assisted by a top investment bank obtain average 
cumulative returns of 25.47% (about 12.6% more 
than the average CARs without at least one top 
advisor).  
Top banks often push their customers towards 
acquisitions that may even be far from what would 
be considered rational grounds (on which decisions 
regarding M&A should be based), just to earn fees. 
 
 
                                                          
33 The result confirms the analysis carried out on the CARs (Appendix “A”: 
Table A-3 and Table A-4) relative to the post-bankruptcy time frame. 
34 The tables (Table A-3 and Table A-4) in the Appendix show that this 
phenomenon is also confirmed by the analysis of the CARs. 
Table 11. Target CAR: the regression model 
corresponding to the post-Lehman crash period 
 
R2 
 
0.281 
Significativity 
 
0.028 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.155 
Parameter  Significativity 
(Constant) 0.388 0.001 
Top-Tier 0.227 0.004* 
Same Industry (0.087) 0.143 
Cross-Border 0.057 0.343 
Toehold (0.031) 0.618 
Deal Value (0.000) 0.099** 
Tot Advisors (0.041) 0.055 
Relative Size (0.016) 0.031 
Stock (0.015) 0.847 
Cash (0.107) 0.193 
Top vs Not (0.002) 0.987 
* Level of significativity from 1 to 5% 
** Level of significativity up to 10% 
 
The analysis shows that the certification effect 
guaranteed by the investment banks (especially by 
those with an extremely high reputation) was not 
effective in the case of the more recent wave of 
M&As. 
Reviewing the other variables, it can be 
observed that the relative size coefficient concerning 
the relative dimensions of the target is at a 
significant minus 5%: the operations for the 
acquisition of control and/or the integration of a 
target which is relatively large compared to the 
acquirer are more complex and lead to the creation 
of less value.  Similarly, the negative coefficient of 
the variable linked to the total number of advisors 
involved in the operation, although barely above the 
significance threshold of 5%, indicates that the more 
advisors there are around the negotiating table, the 
less value will be created. The presence of a high 
number of investment banks can depend on a 
greater complexity of the deal, which results in a 
greater difficulty to release value through the 
operation. Lastly, although border line in respect to 
a significance value of 10%, it can be noted that the 
Deal Value variable has a zero coefficient. This 
means that the size of an operation has been found 
to have no impact on the creation of value for the 
shareholders. 
 
5.5.3. Acquirer Results 
 
As in the case of the analysis of target companies, it 
can also be noted for the buyer companies that there 
are two very different results depending on whether 
the model refers to the pre or post Lehman crash 
period. More specifically, the model relative to the 
pre-bankruptcy period (Table 12), as a whole, is not 
significant. The F test on the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the regression is equal to 1.832, with 
an associated p-value equal to 0.0635. Similarly to the 
scenario observed for the targets, the multi-varied 
regression model in the case of the acquirer, 
suggests that the advisor's reputation is an 
extremely important factor influencing the creation 
of value for the shareholders. 
                                                          
35 It is not possible to link this phenomenon to a problem of the size of the 
sample compared to the relatively high number of predictors considered, 
since  in the case of the targets, the historically accepted general rule is 
satisfied, according to which at least 10 subjects per predictor are required 
(Harris, 1985). 
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Table 12. Acquirer CAR: the regression model 
corresponding to the pre-Lehman crash period 
 
R2 
 
0.109 
Significativity 
 
0.060 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.049 
Parameter  Significativity 
(Constant) (0.020) 0.206 
Top-Tier (0.012) 0.285 
Same Industry (0.002) 0.866 
Cross-Border (0.000) 0.996 
Toehold 0.020 0.096 
Deal Value 0.000 0.713 
Tot Advisors 0.005 0.084 
Relative Size (0.001) 0.713 
Stock 0.016 0.197 
Cash (0.010) 0.454 
Top vs Not 0.020 0.149 
* Level of significativity from 1 to 5% 
** Level of significativity up to 10% 
 
In the case of acquirers pre-Lehman, as seen for 
the model relative to the targets, no empirical 
evidence can be found to indicate that the 
reputation of advisors plays an important role in 
determining the creation of value for the 
shareholders. For that matter, the result is also 
confirmed by the t-test carried out on the CARs 
involving the segmentation of the sample in respect 
to both the period and the presence or absence of an 
advisor36. Returning to the model, it is possible to 
note the positive sign of the coefficient of the 
Toehold variable that is within the limits of 
significance. Contrary to what happens for the 
targets, buyer companies benefit from a toehold in 
the equity of the companies that they wish to 
takeover. The existence of a toehold of at least 5% in 
the equity of the target, results in a CAR for the 
acquirer's shares of more than two percentage 
points. The output relative to the post-crash period 
(Table 13) however, takes on particular importance. 
Compared to the previous model both the R2 and 
the adjusted R2 increase considerably and take on 
important values. In particular, R2 increases from 
10.9% to 38.0% while the adjusted R2 increases from 
4.9% to 27.2%. Furthermore, the model as a whole is 
associated with a p-value below the 1% threshold. In 
addition, the positive and significant coefficient 
(with an associated p-value of 0.032) of the Top-Tier 
variable, which is the variable with the greatest 
weight in the model, indicates that advisors with a 
higher reputation (a greater market share) bring a 
benefit to the shareholders in terms of CAR of 4.4%. 
Consistently with the literature that attributes the 
major part of the deal benefits to target companies, 
it is not surprising that the creation of value for the 
bidder that avails of a primary investment bank is 
considerably lower than that of the target. As 
pointed out for the targets, shareholders' wealth is 
positively influenced by the engagement of a top 
investment bank also in the case of bidders for the 
post-Lehman period37.  
 
 
                                                          
36 Observing the tables in Appendix “A” (Table A-2 and Table A-3), it can be 
seen that in spite of the change of sign in the average of the CARs in the 
presence of a top advisor, it is not possible to draw significant conclusions 
(in view of the very high p-value). 
37 This evidence is also supported by what emerges from the t-test on the 
CARs (Appendix “A”: Table A-3 and Table A-4). The CARs of the bidders 
which take avail of a top investment banker in fact achieve better 
performance. 
Table 13. Acquirer CAR: the regression model 
corresponding to the post-Lehman crash period 
 
R2 
 
0.380 
Significativity 
 
0.001 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.272 
Parameter  Significativity 
(Constant) 0.008 0.77 
Top-Tier 0.044 0.032 
Same Industry (0.035) 0.014 
Cross-Border 0.012 0.42 
Toehold (0.009) 0.532 
Deal Value 0.000 0.676 
Tot Advisors (0.009) 0.104 
Relative Size (0.006) 0.001* 
Stock 0.027 0.167 
Cash 0.032 0.092 
Top vs Not (0.026) 0.17 
* Level of significativity from 1 to 5% 
** Level of significativity up to 10% 
 
However, looking at the coefficients of the 
other variables which are significant, the negative 
coefficient of the Same Industry variable is quite 
surprising. In preceding literature (Morck et al., 
1990; Berger and Ofek, 1995) it was shown that the 
creation of value for the buyer company is greater in 
cases where the target operates in a business 
connected to that of the said buyer. However in the 
model outlined above, an acquisition carried out 
within the same sector would lead to a reduction of 
value for the shareholders equal to 3.5%. This 
evidence supports the hypothesis of the creation of 
value by corporate diversification. Furthermore with 
regard to the Stock variable, although it exhibits a 
high p-value of almost 10%, the positive coefficient 
of this variable indicates that buyer companies, 
unlike seller companies, benefit from payment in the 
form of shares. This result is understandable, if one 
considers that bidders usually offer payment in the 
form of shares when they believe that their own 
shares are over-valued by the market (it is to be 
noted that this subject is discussed in the literature 
with regard to information asymmetries)38. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study, building upon existing empirical 
evidence in the literature has questioned and 
analysed the role of investment banks in M&A 
operations, specifically with regard to the capacity 
of investment banks with the best reputations to 
offer their customers services of a superior quality 
and a corresponding creation of greater value for 
shareholders. The research focused on the 
transactions carried out among listed companies 
inside two time frames which were symmetrical to 
each other with respect to the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy. The analysis highlighted that the 
presence of a top tier investment banks post-
Lehman is associated with higher shareholder 
returns of both target and buyer companies, thus 
supporting the "superior deal hypothesis". However, 
this evidence can be found only in the "post financial 
crisis" period (post-Lehman).  Prior to the Lehman 
collapse, there is no specific evidence of a 
                                                          
38 In Appendix B, the correlation matrices between the variables can be 
consulted. To give further significance to the models, it is observed that the 
scatter plots of the residuals of the regressions in Appendix "C" (Figure C-3 
and Figure C4) show that there is no particular evidence of 
heteroscedasticity. The figures trace good behaviour of the residuals: they 
are alternatively above and below zero and they are distributed in a non-
systematic manner.  
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correlation between the presence of top tier 
investment bank and the creation of higher value for 
shareholders. The term "financial crisis" is used to 
refer to a concept which is difficult to define 
accurately; the research wished to express the idea 
of a different economic/financial context, identifying 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as the key signal 
which started off a period featuring deep changes of 
a structural nature within the investment banking 
sector. The certification effect of investment banks 
relating to M&A operations has been found to have 
no significance in the pre-Lehman crash period. This 
result can be justified if one considers the 
irrationality which prevailed at the time of the more 
recent wave of M&A operations and the context in 
which these deals have taken place (huge availability 
of cash and low yields). The number of deals 
processed and the positive sentiment which featured 
in the capital markets in the years prior to the 
explosion of the crisis, supports the idea that in 
such a context the advisor's reputation and the 
assurance to the market about these deals 
emanating from the certification effect, were 
actually of little importance. The irrational attitude 
of the pre-crash period is confirmed by the change 
of market behaviour after the start of the financial 
crisis. The more careful and rational market has 
given greater importance to and has placed greater 
confidence in the banking institutions which have 
demonstrated before and after the crisis that they 
have maintained strong reputations based upon 
success in managing the corporate control market. 
Therefore, in a time of crisis, the ability of top tier 
investment banks to construct and manage better 
M&A operations has enabled the generation of 
greater synergies and benefits for their customer 
companies, with a consequent growth in value for 
shareholders. Furthermore, the results of the 
research model, especially post Lehman bankruptcy, 
confirm the thesis (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994) 
that states that top tier banks are superior in 
processing and producing information which can 
reduce information asymmetries between the 
diverse players in the market. Thus, the higher the 
banks reputation and credibility is perceived to be 
the greater the certification and validation effect will 
be in the M&A deals that they are involved in. 
Such a result contrasts with what emerging in 
other contributions focusing on different business 
areas of the investment banking industry, namely 
securities issuances, where reputation seems 
showing a decreasing role when compared to other 
key success factors more consistent with 
technological changes occurred in financial markets 
(Morrison et al., 2014). Undoubtedly, the investment 
banking industry is still an opaque – if not black – 
box requiring further research as well as empirical 
analyses with great deal of possible implications for 
policy makers and regulators. 
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APPENDICES 
  
Appendix A. CARs e t-test 
 
Table A-1. One-Sample Test 
 
 Test Value=0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR TARGET (-2, +2) 7,871 85 ,000 ,13937105 ,10416368 ,17457841 
CAR ACQUIRER (-2, +2) -,548 84 ,585 -,00315742 -,01461018 ,00829535 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 0, RANKING FIRST TIER (1) SECOND TIER (0) ADVISOR = 0 
 
Table A-2. One-Sample Test 
 
 Test Value=0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR TARGET (-2, +2) 7,285 74 ,000 ,14471660 ,10513366 ,18429954 
CAR ACQUIRER (-2, +2) ,602 75 ,549 ,00376588 -,00869805 ,01622981 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 0, RANKING FIRST TIER (1) SECOND TIER (0) ADVISOR = 1 
 
Table A-3. One-Sample Test 
 
 Test Value=0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR TARGET (-2, +2) 4,602 47 ,000 ,12878323 ,07248531 ,18508115 
CAR ACQUIRER (-2, +2) -2,833 38 ,007 -,02279384 -,03908364 -,00650404 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 1, RANKING FIRST TIER (1) SECOND TIER (0) ADVISOR = 0 
 
Table A-4. One-Sample Test 
 
 Test Value=0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR TARGET (-2, +2) 5,180 19 ,000 ,25470290 ,15177807 ,35762773 
CAR ACQUIRER (-2, +2) 0,662 28 ,513 ,006625272 ,01386418 ,02711473 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 1, RANKING FIRST TIER (1) SECOND TIER (0) ADVISOR = 1 
 
 
Appendix B. Correlation Matrices between the Variables 
 
Table B-1. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Model 
Top vs 
Not 
Stock 
Same 
Industry 
Deal 
Value 
Toehold 
Cross-
Border 
Relative 
Size 
Tot 
Advisors 
Top-
Tier 
Cash 
Top vs Not 1,000 -,108 ,100 ,139 ,184 ,035 -,013 ,179 -,540 -,133 
Stock -,108 1,000 ,015 ,032 -,212 ,034 -,168 ,075 ,106 ,714 
Same Industry ,100 ,015 1,000 ,067 ,103 ,035 -,083 -,104 -,118 -,008 
Deal Value ,139 ,032 ,067 1,000 ,196 -,138 -,039 -,441 -,275 ,029 
Toehold ,184 -,212 ,103 ,196 1,000 -,049 ,046 -,134 -,216 -,196 
Cross-Border ,035 ,034 ,035 -,138 -,049 1,000 ,111 -,001 -,117 -,059 
Relative Size -,013 -,168 -,083 -,039 ,046 ,111 1,000 -,082 ,028 ,046 
Tot Advisors ,179 ,075 -,104 -,441 -,134 -,001 -,082 1,000 -,174 ,071 
Top-Tier -,540 ,106 -,118 -,275 -,216 -,117 ,028 -,174 1,000 ,117 
Cash -,133 ,714 -,008 ,029 -,196 -,059 ,046 ,071 ,117 1,000 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 0 / DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CAR TARGET (-2,+2) 
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Table B-2. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Model 
Top vs 
Not 
Stock Toehold 
Deal 
Value 
Same 
Industry 
Cross-
Border 
Relative 
Size 
Tot 
Advisors 
Top-
Tier 
Cash 
Top vs Not 1,000 -,097 ,070 ,196 -,102 ,114 ,016 ,254 -,540 -,073 
Stock -,097 1,000 -,155 -,014 -,023 -,107 -,027 ,101 ,057 ,779 
Toehold ,070 -,155 1,000 ,047 -,210 -,025 -,316 -,135 -,069 -,257 
Deal Value ,196 -,014 ,047 1,000 -,058 -,070 -,001 -,031 -,441 -,038 
Same Industry -,102 -,023 -,210 -,058 1,000 ,021 ,254 ,074 -,047 ,112 
Cross-Border ,114 -,107 -,025 -,070 ,021 1,000 ,037 -,188 -,156 -,144 
Relative Size ,016 -,027 -,316 -,001 ,254 ,037 1,000 ,124 ,005 ,144 
Tot Advisors ,179 ,075 -,104 -,441 -,134 -,001 -,082 1,000 -,174 ,071 
Top-Tier -,540 ,106 -,118 -,275 -,216 -,117 ,028 -,174 1,000 ,117 
Cash -,133 ,714 -,008 ,029 -,196 -,059 ,046 ,071 ,117 1,000 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 1 / DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CAR TARGET (-2,+2) 
 
Table B-3. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Model 
Top vs 
Not 
Toehold 
Cross-
Border 
Same 
Industry 
Cash 
Tot 
Advisors 
Relative 
Size 
Deal 
Value 
Top-
Tier 
Stock 
Top vs Not 1,000 ,105 ,103 ,149 -,062 ,119 ,027 ,214 -,539 ,019 
Toehold ,105 1,000 -,049 ,099 -,194 -,139 ,046 ,190 -,209 -,218 
Cross-Border ,103 -,049 1,000 ,041 -,062 ,004 ,113 -,140 -,108 ,033 
Same Industry ,149 ,099 ,041 1,000 -,005 -,103 -,078 ,075 -,121 ,022 
Cash -,062 -,194 -,062 -,005 1,000 ,073 ,048 ,028 ,138 ,712 
Tot Advisors ,119 -,139 ,004 -,103 ,073 1,000 -,082 -,439 -,198 ,067 
Relative Size ,027 ,046 ,113 -,078 ,048 -,082 1,000 -,033 ,031 -,156 
Deal Value ,214 ,190 -,140 ,075 ,028 -,439 -,033 1,000 -,248 ,031 
Top-Tier -,539 -,209 -,108 -,121 ,138 -,198 ,031 -,248 1,000 ,168 
Stock ,019 -,218 ,033 ,022 ,712 ,067 -,156 ,031 ,168 1,000 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 0 / DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CAR ACQUIRER (-2,+2) 
 
Table B-4. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Model 
Top vs 
Not 
Toehold Stock 
Deal 
Value 
Same 
Industry 
Tot 
Advisors 
Cross-
Border 
Relative 
Size 
Cash 
Top-
Tier 
Top vs Not 1,000 ,060 -,033 ,357 ,035 ,242 ,043 ,019 ,025 -,666 
Toehold ,060 1,000 -,155 ,055 -,210 -,121 -,016 -,318 -,256 -,080 
Stock -,033 -,155 1,000 -,034 -,029 ,069 -,129 -,020 ,777 ,107 
Deal Value ,357 ,055 -,034 1,000 -,086 ,002 -,032 -,004 -,058 -,430 
Same Industry ,035 -,210 -,029 -,086 1,000 ,055 ,005 ,263 ,097 ,010 
Tot Advisors ,242 -,121 ,069 ,002 ,055 1,000 -,091 ,103 ,189 -,452 
Cross-Border ,043 -,016 -,129 -,032 ,005 -,091 1,000 ,019 -,148 -,272 
Relative Size ,019 -,318 -,020 -,004 ,263 ,103 ,019 1,000 ,149 ,027 
Cash ,025 -,256 ,777 -,058 ,097 ,189 -,148 ,149 1,000 ,003 
Top-Tier -,666 -,080 ,107 -,430 ,010 -,452 -,272 ,027 ,003 1,000 
PERIODO PRE (0) POST (1) LEHMAN = 1 / DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CAR ACQUIRER (-2,+2) 
 
Appendix C. Scatterplots of Residuals 
 
Figure C-1. Scatterplot of Residuals: Target 
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Figure C-2. Scatterplot of Residuals: Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-3. Scatterplot of Residuals: Acquirer 
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Figure C-4. Scatterplot of Residuals: Acquirer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
